DK 63 
.V7 
1915 
Copy 1 



fks sPKla3. 
Rook 'VT 



PRESENTED liY 



THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM 



THE 

RUSSIAN PROBLEM 



BY 

PAUL VINOGRADOFF. F.B.A. 

i \ 

CORPUS PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY 
OF OXFORD, SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN 
THE UNIVERSITY OF MOSCOW 

1 f>» 



This book is now published by 
ALFRED A. KNOPF 
220 West Forty-second Street 
New York 



NEW YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 




Cfift 

American Historical Eeviev 



2 6 1025 



Printed in Great Britain 
Edinburgh : T. and A. Constable, Printers to His Majesty 



Great events have been crowded into the 
space of a few weeks, and it is difficult to 
regain one's balance in the rush of unexpected 
experiences. Every one feels that there is a 
background to all these c events ' in the shape 
of ' conditions,' and that what is happening 
now is only a manifestation of latent forces 
gathered long before the collision. 

One of the popular surprises of the war 
has been the gigantic strength of Russia, 
and the public spirit which animates her in 
this crisis. The fact that German statesmen 
and military leaders entirely miscalculated 
these forces, in spite or because of the close 
neighbourhood of both countries, is casting 
ridicule on the pedantic conceit of the chosen 
Kultur-people. 

But if 6 conditions ' have been of great 
importance in the war, their study will repay 



vi THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM 

attention when the war is over and the 
immediate occasion for explaining surprising 
facts has passed. The operation of latent 
forces is sure to make itself felt again and 
again in the future. 

The weight of such considerations seems to 
be realised at the present time by the British 
public. A remarkable characteristic of the 
literature which has sprung up in such exu- 
berant growth in regard to the war, has been 
that it is primarily directed to account for 
latent forces and conditions. 

Personally I have had numberless inquiries 
from friends and from strangers about the 
state of Russia, her prospects, her chances 
of peaceful and progressive development. 
English public opinion finds it naturally 
difficult to readjust its estimates : it is not 
very long since the hatchet has been buried 
between the two countries, and, besides, there 
are many traits about the present political 
situation in Russia which rightly shock people 
in the West. But thoughtful observers under- 
stand that it is not this or the other action of 



INTRODUCTORY NOTE vii 

the government that matters, but the general 
evolution of the nation. 

It is felt more and more that a decisive 
transformation is taking place in the Eastern 
Empire, that the effects of this transformation 
are already apparent on all sides, and that its 
general result is a foregone conclusion, in the 
sense of progress from arbitrary methods 
towards the rule of law. 

The two modest contributions to the elucida- 
tion of the great problem, which are offered 
in the present instance, are intended rather to 
raise questions than to solve them, rather to 
point out certain directions of thought than 
to treat of the subject in a consecutive manner. 
A larger book may come later on, but I thought 
that even a lecture and a letter on the great 
problem would not be superfluous by way of 
introduction to such a book. I have been 
led to this assumption partly by the very 
cordial reception which was given me when 
I delivered the lecture published now under 
the heading c Russia after the War,' at Sheffield 
and at Nottingham, to large popular audiences. 



viii THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM 

The letter to the Times on the psychology of 
a nation has also been well received on its 
appearance, and, as the theme is closely 
connected with the subject of the lecture, I 
have taken leave to reproduce its text* 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTORY NOTE v 

RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 1 

RUSSIA. The Psychology of a Nation . . . .29 

i 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



The war, with all its calamities and bereave- 
ments, has certain redeeming features : it forces 
us to look beyond the surface, to verify esti- 
mates and to brush away prejudices, to seek 
for adequate explanations of striking events. 
It is from this educational point of view that 
I should like to approach my subject. I am 
not going to trespass on the domain of strate- 
gists and military historians. I do not intend 
to deal with the causes of the war, the justifi- 
cation of Russian efforts, the curious history 
of diplomatic moves which led up to the colli- 
sion. All these things have been brilliantly 
discussed by competent authorities. I wish to 
consider the aims and methods of Russia. 
The subject is a momentous problem for the 
nations of Europe, and much will depend on 
its right solution. But the problem is even 
more pressing and momentous for the Russians 
themselves. 

A great help in such an inquiry is afforded 

A 



2 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



by a review of the historical surroundings. 
History is not a science enabling us to predict 
coming events with exactness, but it does make 
a signal difference whether we consider facts of 
social life as detached experiences or as links in 
a chain of development. In the first instance we 
shall hardly have anything to guide us but the 
impressions and appetites of the moment. In 
the second, we are able to obtain a wide per- 
spective and a basis for rational plans. Turn- 
ing to the case in point, it is one thing to state 
observations as to the politics and culture of 
present-day Russia, and another to judge of 
Russian political and cultural evolution in the 
light of the history of Europe, and especially 
of Eastern Europe. When we look at abso- 
lutism, bureaucracy, or the domineering habits 
of military aristocracy in Russia from this 
second point of view, we perceive at once that 
what we have to deal with is not the peculiar 
product of Byzantine servilism or Muscovite 
brutality, but one of the features of Eastern 
European development, the expression of forces 
which have been at work and are still at work 
in Prussia and Austria as well. 

If historical laws are to be formulated at all, 
one of the most certain and conspicuous among 



\ 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 3 

them may be summed up in the observation 
that social progress starts from countries with 
a well- differentiated sea-board, and gradually 
spreads to the more massive continental blocks. 
Eventually these blocks of hinterland may prove 
more fertile and rich in culture than the tracts 
which have assumed the initiative ; but it is 
in river deltas, in peninsulas, and in islands 
that the movement of civilisation originates. 
Greece and Italy, France and England, were 
leaders in Europe when the banks of the Elbe, 
of the Danube, of the Vistula, and of the Volga 
were wildernesses. Even in modern times the 
French borrowed largely from the Italians, the 
English from the French, the Germans both 
from English and French, and the Russians 
from the Germans. No wonder Peter the 
Great named his new capital Petersburg — as 
Frederick the Great, while defeating the French 
in the field, acknowledged their supremacy in 
literature and science, and wrote French with 
greater ease than German. The two most 
famous pronouncements of Prussian state- 
craft in the eighteenth century are tinged by 
French thought. Monarchy was to be the 
rocher de bronze — the bronze rock of the 
Prussian system. Every one was to seek 



4 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



salvation 6 nach seiner fagon ' — in his own 
fashion. In the same way, Russia has been 
taking lessons from German administrators 
and thinkers. 

Faced with problems of colonisation and 
self-defence, unprotected by the silver streak 
of the sea, unwilling to subordinate considera- 
tions of safety to the claims of individual 
liberty, the three eastern states have sacrificed 
many elements of prosperity and progress to 
discipline and efficiency in war. Even now 
the Austrian Emperor may assume dictatorial 
power on the strength of the fourteenth clause 
of a constitutional law. His personal authority 
remains the chief link of union in his hetero- 
geneous empire, and Emperor Francis Joseph 
has repeatedly exerted his supreme power for 
adjusting difficulties. Quite recently repre- 
sentative government has been suspended by 
6 Acts of State ' in Bohemia and Croatia. As 
for Germany, the franchise in Prussia is per- 
verted by a narrow property classification, 
while Mecklenburg enjoys the unenviable dis- 
tinction of being the only country in Europe 
which still clings to a system of estates. Even 
the stunted constitutionalism of modern 
Prussia and modern Austria is of quite recent 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



5 



growth. The principle that the 8 scanty intel- 
ligence of subjects ' should not be allowed to 
meddle with statecraft is of German origin. 
It gave way in Prussia during the Revolution 
of 1848, but was triumphantly reasserted in 
the reaction of the 'fifties and in the conflict 
between the Prussian government and national 
representation in the 'sixties. Germany is in- 
debted for its constitutional regeneration to 
the victorious struggle of 1870. In Austria, 
liberal institutions have sprung from defeats : 
the humiliation of military absolutism in 1859 
gave the first blow to political absolutism, and 
the collapse in 1866 resulted in the setting up 
of the present Dual Monarchy in its constitu- 
tional shape. 

It is not difficult to perceive the analogy 
between these retreats of absolutism in Prussia 
and in Austria and the evolution of Russia. 
The protector of Austria and Prussia, Emperor 
Nicholas i., seemed to embody the conception 
of Hobbes's Leviathan, and he experienced in 
his fate the hollowness of a political dream 
requiring that every live man in the country 
should be paralysed in order that Leviathan 
should think and act like one man. The 
Crimean War showed what a poor thing a 



6 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



machine State is even when composed of per- 
sonally brave men. The object-lesson went 
home in the case of the government as well as 
in that of the people, and the forces of political 
insight, patriotic devotion, intellectual con- 
centration, which had been stealthily but 
steadily gathering beneath the iron frame of 
the Nicholas regime, asserted themselves in an 
unexpected manner ; the glorious generation 
of the 'sixties achieved work unsurpassed in 
any land for breadth of view and far-reaching 
results : the emancipation of the serfs, the 
creation of local self-government, the regenera- 
tion of the courts, the beginnings of an inde- 
pendent press, the national reform of military 
service, the reconstitution of the universities 
as self-governing bodies — all these and many 
minor reforms were carried out at that time. 

Unfortunately, changes of that magnitude 
resemble natural processes in which the ulti- 
mate settlement is preceded by conflicts between 
elemental forces. It is sufficiently known how 
the reform movement was arrested by the 
fatal split between the progressive parties 
which strove for parliamentary government, 
and the Conservatives who rallied around the 
principle of autocracy. Terroristic attempts, 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 7 



culminating in the murder of Alexander the 
Second, brought about the long reaction under 
Alexander the Third, ajid the policy of con- 
tradictions after his death. The country had, 
as it were, to pass another examination in the 
Japanese War, and the defects of the auto- 
cratic system were again revealed in a con- 
spicuous manner by the inefficiency of the 
army and the lack of public spirit in the 
people. Then came a time resembling the 
Revolution of 1848 in Central Europe. Im- 
portant positions were permanently gained : 
the beginnings of national representation, the 
declaration of civic rights, an increased freedom 
of the press. But on the exuberance of 
idealism followed a bitter awakening to the 
significance of very real obstacles : the indif- 
ference of the great mass of the people, the 
danger to social order from lawless outcasts, 
the inexperience and doctrinaire delusions of 
popular leaders. The analogy between Russia 
in 1906 and Germany in 1848 is striking even 
as regards details : when one reads the speeches 
in the first Duma, one cannot help recalling 
to mind the debates of the Frankfort parlia- 
ment. 

And now, after some eight years of gloomy 



8 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



reaction, we stand again at the parting of the 
ways. The war of the nations, in which 
thousands of the best men of Russia are being 
sacrificed, has united all in the fundamental 
duty of self-defence; but, more than this, it 
drives people not only to postpone their strife, 
but to reconsider their positions, to reflect on 
the problem of reconstruction which looms in 
the background and will have to be tackled 
in earnest when the days of marches and 
battles have passed. Great words have been 
pronounced from the height of the throne in 
an appeal to united Russia, and this appeal 
has been responded to fully and warmly by all 
parties and nationalities. It is a united and 
not a divided Russia that ought to solve the 
problem of reconstruction. An effort must be 
made to approach it in the light of past experi- 
ence as well as of future aims, without doctrin- 
airism and without selfishness, in the same 
noble spirit of patriotic duty which has given 
such wonderful strength to the Russian armies 
in the field. What we want in Russia is 
not gambling in revolution with its fantastic 
prospects and terrible realities. We want 
thorough organic reforms, something like the 
movement of the 'sixties on a larger scale. 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 9 



The situation would be a providential one for 
a statesman of the calibre of Bismarck. The 
great German Chancellor, though a Prussian 
junker by birth, and a Conservative by allegi- 
ance, had the strength of mind to frame the 
democratic constitution of the German Empire. 
The imperial government in Russia should be 
able to perceive that the uncontested leader- 
ship of the nation through this war imposes 
the moral obligation of generous and far- 
sighted political action. The popularity ac- 
quired by victories should not be squandered 
in petty gains or in the lethargy of fatigue. 
Opportunities like the present do not recur 
twice. It would be too awful to think that this 
one should be lost, and that the dark waves of 
discontent and despair should again resume 
their ceaseless, battering onslaught against the 
foundations of Russian historical institutions. 

In any case, the course of Russian political 
evolution follows on parallel lines with that of 
Russia's western neighbours : from personal 
rule towards constitutionalism. The attempt 
to trace a contrast between Russia and the 
two neighbouring states is altogether mis- 
leading. 

Let us now turn to a consideration of the 



10 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



assets on which a reforming statesmanship 
can reckon : indirectly such an examination 
will suggest some of the aims of progressive 
evolution. 

The first and greatest asset of Russia is its 
peasant democracy. The population of the 
empire amounts at present to some 170,000,000, 
and of these some 80 per cent., that is about 
140,000,000, are peasants, small cultivating 
landowners, in parts rising to the status 
of what used to be called in old England, 
yeomanry. This is the condition of the 
Cossacks, for example. These figures are 
worth careful consideration. In one of his 
vivid letters to the Times, Stephen Graham 
speaks of the endless flow of Russian troops 
through Moscow in the period of mobilisation 
— ' a magnificent peasantry ' he calls them ; 
and Sir Ian Hamilton, when writing from the 
Japanese headquarters in the war of 1904, 
could not help being struck, even in that un- 
fortunate campaign, by the qualities of the 
Russian private soldier, which he rightly 
ascribed to peasant origin and bringing up. 
Now the 6 magnificent peasantry ' is a force 
not only in the military sense. Efforts are 
being made by all political parties in England 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 11 



to revive small land holdings which have been 
swept away by the course of economic evolu- 
tion. It is a great question whether this can 
be done nowadays, but we all feel that in- 
dustrial development, however fruitful in some 
respects, however necessary from an economic 
point of view, is fraught with danger from the 
social point of view : it severs the living con- 
nection of the people with the soil, and subjects 
man too much to the garish trend of town life. 

Russia is fortunate enough to possess 
140,000,000 of frugal, hard-working tillers of 
the soil. Even in the hard age of serfdom the 
peasantry succeeded in preserving personal 
dignity and an unwavering allegiance to its 
religious and political creeds. The village 
community was a strong shield in those days : 
in spite of numberless acts of cruelty and 
arbitrary extortion on the part of the lords, 
it helped to keep up cohesion between the 
members of the peasant class and a standard 
of rural custom. The village, the mir, could be 
described as the necessary defensive organisa- 
tion of the people. 

But it proved to be a fetter for offensive 
purposes, that is, for enterprise and progress, 
and it is slowly giving way before an individual- 



12 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 

istic movement starting from the emancipa- 
tion of 1861, and fostered by recent statutory 
measures. In spite of many shortcomings of 
legislation and policy in this respect, one thing 
seems clear : this growth of private ownership 
has given an immense impetus to energy and 
thrift. And what is still more remarkable, the 
habit of acting together, of making compro- 
mises and arranging for joint effort, a habit 
acquired in connection with mir management, 
has not disappeared now that the village com- 
munity is making way for contractual relations. 
Co-operative associations arise everywhere in 
instinctive and exuberant growth. Recently 
British estates and agricultural exhibitions 
were visited by unexpected guests — by farmers 
from Siberia — members of a widespread and 
powerful co-operative union. The same may 
be said of workmen and agricultural labourers 
— they naturally form closely fitted co-operative 
groups — the so-called artels. This enormous 
peasant mass is well able to take care of itself, 
and the object of reforming legislation in 
regard to it should be to remove police inter- 
ference and to give free play to its life. One 
institution, born of the aristocratic reaction of 
Alexander the Third's time— the tutelage of 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 13 



the land-captains — the squires wielding police 
power and administering justice, ought to 
disappear as soon as possible, and a beginning 
has been made in this direction by the third 
Duma. 

On the other hand, there is a lamentable gap 
to be rilled up as regards provision for the poor. 
The mobilisation of landed property is bound 
to occasion an immense amount of distress in 
spite of certain beneficial effects. Weak and 
improvident members of the villages are losing 
the support of communal organisations, and 
their hold on the land ; the rural proletariat 
is increasing fast, and yet the problem of public 
assistance has not been properly tackled. 
Russian legislators should take to heart the 
example of England, where the initial move 
in the history of the Poor Laws, the Statute of 
1603, followed closely on the disintegration of 
the ancient customary community of copy- 
holders. The old system of throwing the care 
of the destitute mainly on the villages was not 
a success, even in former days. Mendicancy 
was always one of the open sores of Russia, 
partly, no doubt, on account of the national 
leaning towards personal charity, fostered by 
religious impulses. These economically mis- 



14 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



directed efforts are altogether insufficient to 
cope with the evil now, and a comprehensive 
poor law is certainly one of the needs of the 
situation. The development of credit to help 
agriculture and industry, as well as systematic 
measures in aid of emigration, are, of course, 
also indicated, and important beginnings have 
already been made in these directions. 

Besides all these economical and technical 
improvements, there is one requirement which 
towers above all the rest — the requirement of 
popular education. If the Russian peasants 
were to remain illiterate they might not count 
for more in the balance of cultural power than 
the ryots of the Dekkan or the fellahin of 
Egypt. The truth of this is now fully recog- 
nised in Russia, and constant and rapid progress 
may be registered in this respect. The pro- 
vision of elementary schools has become, since 
the 'sixties, the principal plank in the admini- 
strative programme of local self-governing 
bodies, of municipalities and county councils. 

Incitements in this direction have been pro- 
vided by every period of trial and distress. 
The famine and cholera years 1891-1893, for 
example, gave a strong impulse towards ener- 
getic action, because it was recognised on all 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 15 



hands that the best means of guarding against 
disease and counteracting bad seasons lay in 
provident husbandry and a certain standard 
of instruction. Even the reaction after the 
revolutionary outbreak of 1905 and 1906 did 
not contest this point, and the bureaucratic 
ministries of Stolypin, Kokovtzoff , and Gorcmy- 
kin have had to come into line with public 
feeling on the subject. The honour of driving 
back the flood of illiteracy belongs, however, 
primarily to the self-governing institutions of 
the provinces and towns. In order to give 
an idea of the material efforts connected with 
the movement, let me state that in 1877 there 
were about 10,000 provincial schools, and in 
1911, 28,000; and that the zemstvos (provincial 
councils) spent 9,000,000 roubles (somewhat less 
than £1,000,000) on their schools in 1895, and 
73,000,000 (more than £7,000,000) in 1912, the 
latter sum corresponding to nearly 30 per 
cent, of their entire budget. The time is 
approaching when all the children in Russia 
will receive at least three years' elementary 
schooling. 

In more progressive centres, like the capitals, 
universal education has already been reached. 
I may instance, briefly, the way in which we 



16 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



carried out the task in Moscow fourteen years 
ago, when I was myself engaged on the work 
of the educational committee of that city. 
We worked out an expanding scheme for the 
provision of classes to meet the requirements 
of all children reaching the school age, whom 
their parents would care to send to the schools. 
We could not make attendance compulsory by 
law, but, as a matter of fact, all the families 
of the city, the population of which at that 
time numbered about 1,000,000, with a negli- 
gible number of exceptions, did send their boys 
and girls to the town schools. Thus schooling 
was universal without being compulsory. The 
course embraced three years, but it is being 
gradually extended to four ; and secondary 
schools of all kinds are growing fast. 

For the nation as a whole, a definite scheme 
has been worked out and has obtained the 
support of the Duma, by which a network of 
schools sufficient to compass the entire popu- 
lation of school age of the agricultural pro- 
vinces of the Empire, will be organised and 
started in the course of some eight to ten years. 
This will be done, of course, with the help of 
liberal appropriations from the treasury, but 
it cannot be too often repeated that the pioneers 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 17 



of elementary education in Russia have been 
the local self-governing bodies. 

The second general inference from our survey 
should be that the future of Russia depends on 
the essentially peaceful process of democratic 
enlightenment and economic improvement. 
There is yet another fundamental asset in the 
life of modern Russia. In the ebb and flow of 
political strife, people are sometimes apt to 
overlook the great continuous lines which mark 
the trend of development and ensure progress. 
We have seen what a broad democratic basis is 
provided by the peasant population of the Em- 
pire and how all branches of activity have to be 
connected in one way or another with the mighty 
trunk of the country — the Russian peasantry. 
The middle classes have also something to show 
in their history which is very different from the 
supposed servility of Russian political customs. 

In 1864 the state was obliged to recognise 
that the affairs of the nation could not be 
directed satisfactorily by orders from the 
centre, that something more was needed than 
busy chancelleries and provincial governors with 
discretionary powers. The zemstvos — county 
and district councils— were created by law to 
take care of local affairs — of roads, of sanitary 

B 



18 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



work, of schools, of hospitals and almshouses, 
of veterinary inspection, of rural credit and 
agronomic improvements. This vast domain 
was not surrendered without misgivings and 
restrictions— a jealous supervision by police 
officials, governors, and the home ministry was 
extended over the whole area of the self- 
governing zemstvos and towns. 

Another antidote against too liberal a policy 
of the newly created bodies was provided by 
their composition. The Statute of 1864, and 
even more that of 1890, passed under the 
reactionary influences of Alexander the Third's 
reign, gave a privileged position in the zemstvos 
to the landed gentry or noblesse. This was 
achieved by a complicated system of electoral 
colleges and a restricted franchise. It would 
be impossible to examine these measures in 
detail. They found their historical explana- 
tion in the fact that the gentry had for cen- 
turies supplied the official and military class 
which helped to organise and to rule the vast 
empire. At this stage, however, class legisla- 
tion of this kind proved to be mischievous and 
was doomed to failure ; the gentry is fast 
losing ground in consequence of the emancipa- 
tion of the rural serfs ; estate after estate is 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 19 

passing into the hands of business men and of 
the rising peasantry. 

The privileged position in zemstvo self- 
government naturally led to abuses of influ- 
ence and to corruption, but in spite of all such 
checks, the institution struck firm roots and 
prospered. The history of the advance towards 
better sanitation, more numerous and better 
schools, technical improvements of all kinds, 
is the history of one wearisome and protracted 
struggle between the growing forces of public 
opinion and the stubborn resistance of the old 
regime. The rearguard fights of the latter 
often assumed the character of desperate 
counter-attacks, but the flow of self-govern- 
ment continued to press on with elemental 
force. With all its drawbacks and imperfec- 
tions the zemstvo movement has been one of 
the most astonishing illustrations of the action 
of leading ideas on masses — and also of the 
aptitude of the Russians for social work. 
Sometimes, in the days of great national 
calamities, during years of famine or of 
epidemics, in the course of a great war, with 
its immense numbers of wounded and sick to 
be tended, the stream overflowed its banks, as 
it were, and emergency organisations enlisted 



20 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



the services of countless untiring and fearless 
workers from all classes of society. 

Such movements are disliked by hierarchical 
bureaucracy, but they cannot be prevented or 
ignored, and the future lies in the recognition of 
a constant participation of the people at large, 
in all its classes, in public work. One of the 
first measures necessary in that direction is the 
creation of what is called in Russia the small 
zemstvo unit, of a civil parish uniting members 
of all classes in the self-governing locality. 
Under the present system the peasants, though 
emancipated, form rural units of their own, 
while all other inhabitants — small landowners, 
merchants, artisans, clerks, members of the 
liberal professions— are only organised in the 
province and district or not organised at all 
for self-government. When this anomaly is 
remedied, a firm basis will be gained for 
widening the zemstvo franchise with its 
attendant responsibilities and rights. In the 
towns the defects of class privilege are less 
felt, but an extension of the franchise is also 
urgently needed. 

One of the effects of such an extension may 
prove to be unexpected : I think it will 
strengthen rational conservatism. The un- 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



21 



organised third estate of Russia, the vague 
class called the 6 intelligents,' and led by the 
liberal professions — lawyers, doctors, statis- 
ticians, engineers, and teachers — is at present 
often revolutionary and apt to indulge in un- 
practical speculations, because it has no stake 
in the everyday management of public affairs. 
Its members have often a thorough experience 
in certain branches of public work, for example, 
in medical attendance on the poor ; but they 
are made to act as subordinate officials under 
orders from the squires and rich traders who 
control the counties and the municipalities. 
Such a position naturally produces bitterness 
and sweeping criticism. The greater the stake 
of every citizen in public affairs, the more 
readily he will recognise limitations and cope 
with difficulties in a practical manner. One 
thing is certain, the channels for sound self- 
government exist in Russia, and it is only 
necessary to widen them and to build out their 
network. 

What is to be said about the central govern- 
ment itself ? This is the part of the edifice 
which is most noticeable to the view of 
foreigners and which has certainly an immense 
importance in shaping the general course of 



22 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



political life. In this matter, more than in 
anything else, it is impossible to express more 
than a personal opinion, conditioned by a 
party point of view, but even such personal 
opinions may be worth consideration. It seems 
clear, to begin with, that it would be a fatal 
mistake to indulge in anti-monarchical, anti- 
dynastic agitation. Men from the extreme left 
may be to some extent bound by revolutionary 
antecedents, the majority even on the radical 
side will, it is to be hoped, perceive that, after 
a glorious war in which the nation has rallied 
with the sure instinct of self-preservation 
round its historical leader, it would not be 
proper to challenge the authority of this 
leader. Even apart from the peculiar circum- 
stances of the moment, Russia needs a strong 
central power, endowed with uncontested 
sovereignty, armed with the full force of 
popular delegation. But just because the 
Tsar undoubtedly wields such a power, its 
holder need not resort to any petty expedients, 
or indulge in party strife, or aspire to meddle 
in all the details of legislation and adminis- 
tration. The competence of the Emperor of 
Russia cannot be circumscribed by the limita- 
tions of classical parliamentary government. 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



23 



The maxim ' le roi regne, mais ne gouverne pas ' 
could not be applied to him in common sense. 
But no more would the maxim ' PEtat c'est 
moi ' be applicable in this case. 

A sovereign exercising the supreme regulating 
power in the Empire can well afford to take care 
that popular representation in his State should 
not be a farce and that his ministers should 
not act as the viziers of an Oriental despot. 
Cabinet government and the rule of parlia- 
mentary majorities may still be far ahead in 
Russian political evolution, but a reform of 
the Duma, which would do away with the 
Austrian-born jugglery of electoral colleges 
and a prohibitive franchise, is a first step which 
ought not to be delayed much longer. It is 
not necessary to introduce universal suffrage 
according to the famous four-tailed formula — 
universal, equal, secret, and direct. Let there 
by all means be a householder's franchise or 
election in two stages, but the electoral system 
ought to be simple and conduce to a manifesta- 
tion of genuine public opinion. 

A necessary complement to the reform of 
the Duma must be that of the Russian House 
of Lords — the Council of the Empire. In its 
present condition it is a clog on all progressive 



24 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



legislation. Even bills passed by the arti- 
ficially manipulated Duma of our days have 
stuck in the Council of the Empire. A notable 
example was the measure granting self- 
government to the Polish provinces. It was 
surrounded in the Duma with all sorts of 
guarantees against possible misuse by the 
Poles, but it contained one important and vital 
concession — it allowed the Poles to use their 
own language in the debates of county and 
town councils. The Council of the Empire 
struck out this clause. Characteristically 
enough the bill was re-introduced by the 
government with the objectionable clause — 
by express command of the Emperor. If a 
Second Chamber is to exist and to play a useful 
part in Russian political life, it must be entirely 
reconstructed. Instead of a majority com- 
posed of superannuated bureaucrats, with a 
sprinkling of elective elements, it ought to be 
based on the representation of public bodies 
and interests — the county councils, the leading 
professional and economic organisations. 

Again, even if it should be out of the question 
to speak of ministries formed from the leading 
political parties, if the ministers remain officials 
selected and directed by the Tsar, they should 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 25 

be chosen in such a way as not to defy clearly 
expressed public opinion. Surely it is not 
wise to place and keep in office men who have 
been repeatedly denounced by assemblies con- 
stituted to please the government. The baneful 
discord of views and policy which nowadays is 
almost a standing feature of Russian politics 
ought to cease : it is not a symptom of health. 

A more difficult problem arises in regard to 
the large bureaucratic establishments of the 
civil service. The traditions of bureaucracy are 
certainly not promising, and yet one can neither 
get rid of the complex mechanism of central 
control nor alter its spirit and habits at one 
stroke. The problem of gradual sanitation is 
not insoluble, however, if the new watchwords 
of legality and respect for individual freedom 
be firmly given out and enforced. There is in 
the modern history of Russia a remarkable 
instance of a very rapid improvement in a 
kindred domain, namely, in the administra- 
tion of justice. The courts were notoriously 
corrupt and pettifogging in the old days, and 
yet the great statutes of 1864 were wonder- 
fully efficient in introducing new principles 
and new methods. A similar new orientation 
must be effected as regards the civil services ; 



26 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 

and it is to be hoped that the universities will 
not fail in infusing new blood into the adminis- 
trative personnel, as they have done in the 
case of the judicature. 

One idea has to be kept well in view all the 
time. It is not so much technical changes that 
are important, although these will have to be 
taken in hand ; the most important point is 
the substitution of the rule of law and freedom 
for the reign of arbitrary discretion. A firm 
Habeas Corpus Act, a real application of the 
various liberties, which for Europeans are as 
necessary as breathing air, — freedom of con- 
science, freedom of speech, freedom of associa- 
tion, freedom of meetings, equality before the 
law — these are the things needed above all in 
Russia. These liberties are recognised in prin- 
ciple and stunted in application. On the 
17th of October 1914 a solemn pledge was 
taken to give these principles full play and 
adequate guarantees, but the country is still 
waiting for the fulfilment of this pledge. That 
is where the Jewish question comes in, of 
course. Racial antipathy and the fact that 
the Jewish character has specific defects as well 
as specific qualities do not warrant a treat- 
ment of our Jewish countrymen as equals in 



RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 27 



burdens and as outcasts in rights. This 
anomaly has existed more or less everywhere 
in Europe, and everywhere it has given way — 
so it will be in Russia, and the longer the day 
of emancipation is delayed, the more difficult 
it will be to effect the ultimate settlement. 

I do not want, however, to discuss problems 
of detail at any length : my object was to set 
forth what appear to me to be the conditions 
of the one and main problem — the conditions 
of Russia's coming of age in public life. Nor 
do I want to prophesy in regard to the steps 
and circumstances by which the transforma- 
tion will be effected : details will depend on 
many accidents which no one can foresee ; 
nor is it likely that the walls of Jericho will 
fall at one blast of the trumpets. But apart 
from details, I firmly believe that the trans- 
formation is approaching, and I hope it may 
be effected somewhat on the lines I have 
sketched. I am sure of one thing — the people 
of Russia, and more especially the educated 
class, the ' intelligents, 5 will revive in the 
atmosphere of the great reform movement and 
may yet astonish the world in peace as in war. 
The educated Russian, of whom I can speak 
with some knowledge, may have many faults — 



28 RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 



he may be too impulsive, lacking in discipline, 
inexperienced in politics ; but he has one 
quality which will save him and will save his 
country. He is longing to serve a great idea 
and to merge his insignificant self in a common 
cause. He is by nature a crusader. Let us 
wish success to his crusade. 



RUSSIA 1 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 

In this time of crisis, when the clash of ideas 
seems as fierce as the struggle of the hosts, it is 
the duty of those who possess authentic infor- 
mation on one or the other point in dispute to 
speak out firmly and clearly. I should like 
to contribute some observations on German 
and Russian conceptions in matters of culture. 
I base my claim to be heard on the fact that I 
have had the privilege of being closely con- 
nected with Russian, German, and English 
life. As a Russian Liberal, who had to give 
up an honourable position at home for the 
sake of his opinions, I can hardly be suspected 
of subserviency to the Russian bureaucracy. 

I am struck by the insistence with which 
the Germans represent their cause in this 
world-wide struggle as the cause of civilisation 
as opposed to Muscovite barbarism ; and I am 

1 Reprinted, by permission, from the Times of September 14, 
1914. 

29 



30 



RUSSIA 



not sure that some of my English friends do 
not feel reluctant to side with the subjects of 
the Tsar against the countrymen of Harnack 
and Eucken. One would like to know, how r - 
ever, since when have the Germans taken up 
this attitude ? They were not so squeamish 
during the ' war of emancipation ' which gave 
birth to modern Germany. At that time the 
people of Eastern Prussia were anxiously wait- 
ing for the appearance of Cossacks, as heralds 
of the Russian hosts who were to emancipate 
them from the yoke of Napoleon. Did the 
Prussians and Austrians reflect on the humilia- 
tion of an alliance with the Muscovites, and 
on the superiority of the Code Civil, when the 
Russian Guard at Kulm 1 stood like a rock 
against the desperate onslaught of Vandamme ? 
Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin 

1 Kulm. After the defeat of the Allies by Napoleon at Dresden 
in 1813, the French corps of Vandamme appeared in their rear. 
If it had succeeded in cutting the line of communications with 
Prague, the retreat of the Allies might have been turned into a 
rout. The First Division of the Russian Guard was ordered to stop 
Vandamme, and this it did at Kulm on August 29, although it was 
outnumbered by three to one and lost almost half its men in killed 
and wounded. On the next day, Prussian and Austrian troops 
came up, and Vandamme surrendered with the remainder of his 
corps. The battle was the turning-point in the campaign of 1813. 
The King of Prussia granted the Iron Cross to all those who took 
part in this desperate struggle ; hence the Iron Cross was called 
the ' Kulm Cross ' by the Russians. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 31 



have obliterated the bas-relief in the 6 Alley 
of Victories ' which represents Prince William 
of Prussia, the future victor of Sedan, seeking 
safety within the square of the Kaluga regi- 
ment ! 1 Russian blood has flowed in number- 
less battles in the cause of the Germans and 
Austrians. The present Armageddon might 
perhaps have been avoided if the Tsar Nicholas i. 
had left the Hapsburg monarchy to its own 
resources in 1849, and had not unwisely crushed 
the independence of Hungary. Within our 
own memory, the benevolent neutrality of 
Russia guarded Germany in 1870 from an 
attack in the rear by its opponents of Sadowa. 
Are all such facts to be explained away on the 
ground that the despised Muscovites may be 
occasionally useful as 6 gun-meat,' but are 
guilty of sacrilege if they take up a stand 
against German taskmasters in c shining 
armour ' ? The older generations of Germany 
had not yet reached that comfortable conclu- 
sion. The last recommendation which the 
founder of the German Empire made on his 

1 Prince William of Prussia and the Kaluga regiment. The 
future conqueror of Sedan first fought as a boy of seventeen at 
Bar-sur-Aube (February 27, 1814). In that battle he joined the 
Russian Fifth Infantry (Kaluga), a regiment of which he after- 
wards became an honorary colonel. 



32 



RUSSIA 



death-bed to his grandson was to keep on good 
terms with that Russia which is now proclaimed 
to be a debased mixture of Byzantine, Tartar, 
and Muscovite abominations. 

Fortunately, the course of history does not 
depend on the frantic exaggerations of partisans. 
The world is not a class-room in which docile 
nations are distributed according to the arbi- 
trary standards of German pedagogues. Europe 
has admired the patriotic resistance of the 
Spanish, Tyrolese, and Russian peasants to the 
enlightened tyranny of Napoleon. There are 
other standards of culture besides proficiency 
in research and aptitude for systematic work. 
The massacre of Louvain, the hideous brutality 
of the Germans towards non-combatants — to 
mention only one or two of the appalling 
occurrences of these last weeks — have thrown 
a lurid light on the real character of twentieth- 
century German culture. ' By their fruits ye 
shall know them, 5 said our Lord ; and the 
saying which He aimed at the Scribes and 
Pharisees of His time is indeed applicable to 
the proud votaries of German civilisation to- 
day. Nobody wishes to underestimate the 
services rendered by the German people to the 
cause of European progress ; but those who 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 33 

have known Germany during the years follow- 
ing the achievements of 1870, have watched 
with dismay the growth of that arrogant 
conceit which the Greeks called vfipus. The 
cold-blooded barbarity advocated by Bern- 
hardt the cynical view taken of international 
treaties and of the obligations of honour by the 
German Chancellor — these things reveal a spirit 
which it would be difficult indeed to describe 
as a sign of progress. 

One of the effects of such a frame of mind is 
to strike the victim of it with blindness. This 
symptom has been manifest in the stupendous 
blunders of German diplomacy. The succes- 
sors of Bismarck have alienated their natural 
allies, such as Italy and Roumania, and have 
driven England into this war against the evi- 
dent intentions of English Radicals. But the 
Germans have misconceived even more im- 
portant things. They set out on their adven- 
ture in the belief that England would be 
embarrassed by civil war and unable to take 
any effective part in the fray ; and they had 
to learn something which all their writers had 
not taught them— that there is a nation's 
spirit watching over England's safety and 
greatness, a spirit at whose mighty call all 

c 



34 



RUSSIA 



party differences and racial strifes fade into 
insignificance. In the same way, they had 
reckoned on the impreparedness of Russia, in 
consequence of internal dissensions and admini- 
strative weakness, without taking heed of the 
love of all Russians for Russia, of their devo- 
tion to the long-suffering giant whose life is 
throbbing in their veins. The Germans ex- 
pected to encounter raw and sluggish troops, 
under intriguing time-servers and military 
Hamlets, whose 6 native hue of resolution ' had 
been ' sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' 
Instead of that, they were confronted with 
soldiers of the same type as those whom 
Frederick the Great and Napoleon admired, 
led at last by chiefs worthy of their men. And 
behind these soldiers they discovered a nation. 
Do they realise now what a force they have 
awakened ? Do they understand that a 
steadfast, indomitable resolution, despising all 
theatrical display, is moving Russia's hosts ? 
Even if the Russian generals had proved 
mediocre, even if many disappointing days had 
been in store, the nation would not have belied 
its history. It has seen more than one con- 
quering army go down before it. The Tartars 
and the Poles, the Swedes of Charles xn., the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 35 



Prussians of Frederick the Great, the Grand 
Army of Napoleon, were not less formidable 
than the Kaiser's array, but the task of master- 
ing a united Russia proved too much for each 
one of them. The Germans counted on the 
fratricidal feud between Poles and Russians, 
on the resentment of the Jews, on Mohammedan 
sympathies with Turkey, and so forth. They 
had to learn too late that the Jews had rallied 
round the country of their hearths, and that 
the best of them cannot believe that Russia 
will continue to deny them the measure of 
justice and humanity which the leaders of 
Russian thought have long acknowledged 
to be due to them. More important still, 
the Germans have read the Grand Duke's 
appeal to the Poles, and must have heard of 
the manner in which it was received in Poland, 
of the enthusiastic support offered to the 
Russian cause. If nothing else came of this 
great historical upheaval but the reconcilia- 
tion of the Russians and their noble kinsmen 
the Poles, the sacrifices which this crisis 
demands would not be too great a price to pay 
for the result. 

But the hour of. trial has revealed other 
things. It has appealed to the best feelings 



36 



RUSSIA 



and the best elements of the Russian nation. 
It has brought out in a striking manner the 
fundamental tendency of Russian political 
life and the essence of Russian culture, which 
so many people have been unable to perceive 
on account of the chaff on the surface. Russia 
has been going through a painful crisis. In 
the words of the Manifesto of October 17-30, 
1905, the outward casing of her administra- 
tion had become too narrow and oppressive 
for the development of society with its growing 
needs, its altered perceptions of rights and 
duties, its changed relations between govern- 
ment and people. The result was that deep- 
seated political malaise which made itself felt 
during the Japanese War, when Russian society 
at large refused to take any interest in the fate 
of the army ; the feverish rush for ' liberties ' 
after the defeat ; the subsequent reign of re- 
action and repression, which has cast such a 
gloom over Russian life during these last years. 
But the effort of the national struggle has 
dwarfed all these misunderstandings and mis- 
fortunes, as in Great Britain the call of the 
common Motherland has dwarfed the dispute 
between Unionists and Home Rulers. Russian 
parties have not renounced their aspirations ; 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 37 

Russian Liberals in particular believe in self- 
government and the rule of law as firmly as 
ever. But they have realised as one man that 
this war is not an adventure engineered by un- 
scrupulous ambition, but a decisive struggle 
for independence and existence ; and they are 
glad to be arrayed in close ranks with their 
opponents from the Conservative side. A 
friend, a Liberal like myself, writes to me from 
Moscow : 6 It is a great, unforgettable time ; 
we are happy to be all at one ! ' And from 
the ranks of the most unfortunate of Russia's 
children, from the haunts of the political exiles 
in Paris, comes the news that Bourtzeff, one 
of the most prominent among the revolu- 
tionary leaders, has addressed an appeal to 
his comrades urging them to stand by their 
country to the utmost of their power. 1 

I may add that whatever may have been the 
shortcomings and the blunders of the Russian 
government, it is a blessing in this decisive 
crisis that Russians should have a firmly-knit 
organisation and a traditional centre of 
authority in the power of the Tsar. The 
present Emperor stands as the national leader, 

1 Bourtzeff, a prominent Russian revolutionary leader. I am glad 
to note that Bourtzeff fully endorses my view in a letter to the 
Times (issue of September 18, 1914). 



38 



RUSSIA 



not in the histrionic attitude of a War Lord, 
but in the quiet dignity of his office. He has 
said and done the right thing, and his subjects 
will follow him to a man. We are sure he will 
remember in the hour of victory the unstinted 
devotion and sacrifices of all the nationalities 
and parties of his vast Empire. It is our firm 
conviction that the sad tale of reaction and 
oppression is at an end in Russia, and that our 
country will issue from this momentous crisis 
with the insight and strength required for the 
constructive and progressive statesmanship of 
which it stands in need. 

Apart from the details of political and social 
reform, is the regeneration of Russia a boon 
or a peril to European civilisation ? The 
declamations of the Germans have been as mis- 
leading in this respect as in all others. The 
master-works of Russian literature are acces- 
sible in translation nowadays, and the cheap 
taunts of men like Bernhardi recoil on their 
own heads. A nation represented by Pushkin, 
Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky in literature, 
by Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin, Glinka, 
Moussorgsky, Tchaikovsky in art, 1 by Mende- 

1 Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin, etc. Only a few names are 
selected, almost at random. Of course, no description of pictures 
and no characterisation of painters can convey any adequate im- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 39 



leeff, Metchnikoff, Pavloff in science, by Kluch- 
evsky and Solovieff in history, need not be 
ashamed to enter the lists in an international 
competition for the prizes of culture. But the 
German historians ought to have taught their 
pupils that in the world of ideas it is not such 
competitions that are important. A nation 
handicapped by its geography may have to 
start later in the field, and yet her performance 
may be relatively better than that of her more 
favoured neighbours. It is astonishing to read 
German diatribes about Russian backwardness 
when one remembers that as recently as fifty 
years ago Austria and Prussia were living under 
a regime which can hardly be considered more 
enlightened than the present rule in Russia. 
The Italians in Lombardy and Venice have 
still a vivid recollection of Austrian gaols ; and 
as for Prussian militarism, one need not go 
further than the exploits of the Zabern garri- 
son to illustrate its meaning. This being so, 
it is not particularly to be wondered at that the 
Eastern neighbour of Austria and Prussia has 
followed to some extent on the same lines. 

But the general direction of Russia's evolu- 

pressioD. Those who wish to form an opinion of Russian painting- 
should go to Moscow and pay a visit to the Tretiakoff Gallery. 



40 



RUSSIA 



tion is not doubtful. Western students of her 
history might do well, instead of sedulously 
collecting damaging evidence, to pay some atten- 
tion to the building-up of Russia's universities, 
the persistent efforts of the zemstvos, the inde- 
pendence and the zeal of the Press. German 
scholars should read Herzen's vivid descrip- 
tion of the ' idealists of the 'forties.' 1 And 
what about the history of the emancipation 
of the serfs, or of the regeneration of the 
judicature ? The 6 reforms of the 'sixties ' 2 are 
a household word in Russia, and surely they 
are one of the noblest efforts ever made by a 
nation in the direction of moral improvement. 

1 The idealists of the 'forties. They have been described by 
Herzen in his Byloe i Dumy (Past and Thoughts) in connection 
with intellectual life in Moscow. Both Westerners like Granovsky, 
Stankevitch, Ketscher, Herzen himself, and Slavophiles like 
J. Kireievsky and Chomiakoff, are vividly characterised in this 
brilliant autobiography. 

2 The reforms of the 'sixties. They comprise the great reforms 
carried out with rare patriotism and insight during the early years 
of Alexander n.'s reign. The principal were — the emancipation of 
the peasants (1861), the reorganisation of the judicial system (1864), 
and the creation of zemstvo self-government (1864). There was 
a number of other reforms besides — the University Statutes of 
1863, the Press Law of 1865, the partial abolition of corporal 
punishment in 1863 ; and so forth. Many of these reforms have 
been adulterated by subsequent modifications ; but the main 
current of progress could not be turned back, and there are no 
greater names in the history of Europe than those of N. Milutine, 
D. Milutine, Prince Cherkassky, J. Samarine, Unkovsky, Zarudny, 
and their companions. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 41 

Looking somewhat deeper, what right have 
the Germans to speak of their ideals of culture 
as superior to those of the Russian people ? 
They deride the superstitions of the mujikh as 
if tapers and genuflexions were the principal 
matters of popular religion. Those who have 
studied the Russian people without prejudice 
know better than that. Read Selma Lager- 
loef's touching description of Russian pilgrims 
in Palestine. 1 She, the Protestant, has under- 
stood the true significance of the religious 
impulse which leads these poor men to the 
Holy Land, and which draws them to the 
numberless churches of the vast country. 
These simple people cling to the belief that 
there is something else in God's world besides 
toil and greed ; they flock towards the light, 
and find in it the justification of their human 
craving for peace and mercy. For the Russian 
people have the Christian virtue of patience 
in suffering : their pity for the poor and 
oppressed is more than an occasional mani- 
festation of individual feeling — it is deeply 
rooted in national psychology. This frame of 
mind has been scorned as fit for slaves ! It is 

1 Selma Lagerloef on Russian pilgrims. — e Jerusalem/ vol. ii., 'On 
the Wings of the Dawn.' 



42 



RUSSIA 



indeed a case where the learning of philosophers 
is put to shame by the insight of the simple- 
minded. Conquerors should remember that 
the greatest victories in history have been won 
by the unarmed — by the Christian confessors 
whom the emperors sent to the lions, by the 
6 old believers ' of Russia who went to Siberia 
and to the flames for their unyielding faith, by 
the Russian serfs who preserved their human 
dignity and social cohesion in spite of the ex- 
actions of their masters, by the Italians, Poles, 
and Jews, when they were trampled under 
foot by their rulers. It is such a victory of 
the spirit that Tolstoy had in mind when he 
preached his gospel of non-resistance ; and I 
do not think even a German on the war-path 
would be blind enough to suppose that Tolstoy's 
message came from a craven soul. The orien- 
tation of the so-called 6 intelligent ' class in 
Russia — that is, the educated middle class, 
which is much more numerous and influential 
than people suppose — is somewhat different, 
of course. It is 4 Western ' in this sense, that 
it is imbued with current European ideas as 
to politics, economics, and law. It has to a 
certain extent lost the simple faith and reli- 
gious fervour of the peasants. But it has 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION 43 



faithfully preserved the keynote of popular 
ideals. It is still characteristically humani- 
tarian in its view of the world and in its aims. 
A book like that of General von Bernhardi 
would be impossible in Russia. If anybody 
were to publish it, it would not only fall flat, 
but earn for its author the reputation of a 
bloodhound. Many deeds of cruelty and 
brutality happen, of course, in Russia, but no 
writer of any standing would dream of build- 
ing up a theory of violence in vindication of a 
claim to culture. It may be said, in fact, that 
the leaders of Russian public opinion are 
pacific, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian to a 
fault. The mystic philosopher, Vladimir Solo- 
vieff, 1 used to dream of the union of the churches 
with the Pope as the spiritual head, and 
democracy in the Russian sense as the broad 
basis of the rejuvenated Christendom. Bos- 
toyevsky, a writer most sensitive to the claims 
of nationality in Russia, defined the ideal of 
the Russians in a celebrated speech as the em 
bodiment of a universally humanitarian type. 

1 Vladimir Solouieff. A talented philosopher, the son of the 
famous historian S. Solovieff. He was professor at Moscow for 
a short time. 

2 Dostoievsky s speech. • It was delivered in Moscow in 1880, on 
the occasion of the unveiling of Pushkin's statue in that city. 



44 



RUSSIA 



These are extremes, but characteristic ex- 
tremes pointing to the trend of national 
thought. Russia is so huge and so strong, that 
material power has ceased to be attractive to 
her thinkers. Nevertheless, we need not yet 
retire into the desert or deliver ourselves to be 
bound hand and foot by c civilised 5 Germans. 
Russia also wields a sword — a charmed sword, 
blunt in an unrighteous cause, but sharp 
enough in the defence , of right and freedom. 
And this war is indeed our Befreiungskrieg. 
The Slavs must have their chance in the 
history of the world, and the date of their 
coming of age will mark a new departure in 
the growth of civilisation. 



Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to His Majesty 
at the Edinburgh University Press 



